

~~SECRET~~7 May 64 *wpr*

PKE

FYI, comments, ~~edit~~ suggestions, etc.

Attached is outline, in considerable detail, of parts I, II, and III of *Study, Transition*^{ca} on which I am meanwhile ~~drafting~~ engaged in drafting;

and former outline of ~~the~~ last January, on which I have been building revisions.

Parts I, II, and III (sub-chapters) ^{will} replace ^{what was planned on} parts of pages 1 and 2 of the old outline, attached.

Still coming up, are the outlines (and drafting too) for the remaining "parts", somewhat as follows:

~~IV~~

IV: Change and Continuity, Feb. 1961-March 1962 (~~from (Dulles to first~~
(DCI Dulles, then DCI McCone, ~~ending~~ ^{both} in relation to NSC etc. during Kennedy's first year) — *comparison and contrast*).

V: Changes of Command within CIA and USIB (major changes of leadership, of management policy and reorganization), 1961-1962. General considerations; also separate sub-chapters, possibly, for DD/I, DD/P, DD/S and DD/R-S/T (?)

VI: CIA's Changing Image, 1961-63 ~~and~~ (particularly at Presidential, Congressional, and "public" levels of appreciation and criticism)

VI: Transition Epilogue, November 1963: CIA in the National Emergency of Kennedy's Assassination and Johnson's Takeover.

impressive but kaleidoscopic, because it does touch so many facets so briefly. Suppose text will make it seem simpler by bringing out relationships & continuities. Your use of provocative quotation marks also makes for jumpy reading in the outline.

No particular suggestions except a probably unnecessary warning not to give too much attention to matters of only tangential or background significance for the story of CIA-DCI.

7 May 1966

From Dulles to McLean,
2 ~~to President~~ in

- meet ^his^ needs.
CIA Support relationships wi

Cuban Bay of Pigs)

stanto

with CIA, and a man destined for a ~~a~~ a man ~~presently~~ currently in 1961
and several ~~boys~~ and a man destined to have a future then undreamed of
and presumably not ~~to~~ planned for (either in or out of CIA) by
the "near-term planning" experts et al).
In the case of post-cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, selected

(Re-established

- ls: "wandering"
studied and
stayed in the
household of the
r
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her liaison with their chief assistants, e.g. Gilpatric, e

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Likewise, there were a few (relatively fewer) overseas military command changes, ~~that required~~ involving U.S. Sr Rep status (re-check) or Washington command-channel status (e.g. Lemnitzer replacing Twining ^{already in fall 1960}), which in that required special CIA "handling", from command-relationship view point.

Defense Department, furthermore, was on the eve of reorganizing its extensive intelligence assets, with McNamara's blessing (re-check), per JSC recommendation, ^{starting} early 1961: special liaison at CIA ^{via Kirkpatrick and Balmer?}

USIB principals changed, somewhat, early in 1961: notably Hilsman and Hughes, ~~at State~~, replacing Cumming and Eltinge ^{at State}.

Although ~~although~~ not all changes were "political", they were all part of the climate atmosphere of change in 1961 (e.g., military chiefs who were being "rotated"--recheck re validity of rotation-of-duty ^{policy}); they all were part of the 1961 atmosphere of "change"; and they all required special "attention" of CIA and DCI, both through the USIB mechanisms and ~~and~~ through informal measures to ~~to~~ establish ~~comfortable~~ team work in the Community, ~~at least~~ ^{at least} ~~in head quarters~~ ^{at State -- leadership passed to}

~~also at Navy~~ ^{leadership changed} (Lawrence for Frost), ~~also~~ NSA (Frost for Sanford); ~~which were~~ ^{not} presumably not "political" but military "rotations" - of - duty "changes"; but USIB "political" ^{changes}.

3. President Kennedy's Early Concern for Modifying the NSC "Machinery" (inspired by "Scoop" Jackson's Senate studies? ~~and~~ other sources?): Experimentation, Jan.- April 1961 (up to Cuban ~~Bay of Pigs~~ ^{Bay of Pigs}):

NSC meetings: DCI (Dulles) was ^{of special significance because he was} the only ^{NSC} member (along with Lay as secretary) who bridged the gap from the old to the new

Administration; briefings continued; meetings tapered off, ^{NSC atmosphere right}

NSC membership, pro forma, remained unchanged: Robt Kennedy was not added.

NSC secretariat: Bundy (then Bundy and Rostow) in charge ex officio, as Gray had been; Lay as 'executive secretary' ~~soon~~ resigned ~~in~~ (Feb. 1961, effective May 1961), leaving Boggs, his assistant, as "act ng"; ~~at~~ later, Bromley Smith took over, when his OCB was abolished; ^{CIA liaison}

OCB abolished: but ~~continuing~~ ^{apparently continued} its work was done under various assumed names, otherwise, by DCI and DOD and State undersecretaries, with Bundy, Rostow, and Bromley Smith, all involved;

Pres. Board for Intelligence was left dormant (not technically abolished), Jan.-April 1961; ^{CIA liaison}

Committee of Principals (Nuclear Testing), continued as is, probably strengthened rather than weakened, in view of new Administration's announced policy objectives in "disarmament" field; ^{CIA liaison} Mc Cloy, then, ~~at~~ Foster, at new ACDA; with OSI (Scoville) continuing as DCI's chief backstop.

DCI's special responsibilities to the President; both for ^{intelligence} for NSC-directed Operations; and ^{traditionally} by now for President-requested Policy advice; these were all left ^{undisturbed} in theory and in practice, in early months, by Kennedy. Illustrated in Cuba, Laos, Western European problems etc etc,